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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Contracts: Legislation: Effect of clause against oral modification or
discharge.-With the enactment of Section 33-C of the Ne'w York Personal
Property Law' (and the identical Section 282 of the Real Property Law2 ),
the problem of drafting an instrument to prevent its subsequent oral modi-
fication or discharge must be reconsidered in New York. This statute,
effective September 1, 1941, provides:
"When written agreement or other instrument cannot be modi-
fied by oral executory agreement. An executory agreement here-
ther made shall be ineffective to change or modify, or to discharge in
whole or in part, a written agreement or other written instrument here-Iafter executed which contains a provision to the effect that it cannot be
changed orally, unless such executory agreement is in writing and signed
by the party against whom enforcement of the change, modification or
discharge is sought."
Adopted pursuant to the recommendation of the New York Law Revision
Commission,3 this enactment is part of the legislation supplementing the
abolition of the seal in New York.4 Section 342 of the Civil Practice Act
'was amended to make the presence or absence of a seal on an instrument
executed after September 1, 1941 "without legal effect." Prior to this
amendment, a modification or discharge of a sealed instrument, to the extent
that it was executory,6 was enforceable in New York only if embodied in
an instrument executed with equal solemnity7 or, after September 1, 1935,
in a writing signed by the party to be charged with the change, modification
or discharge.8 Section 33-C is designed to serve the previous function of
the seal in making it possible for a party to a contract to protect himself
against the danger of false claims of an executory oral change.9
IL 1941, c. 329, § 5.2L. 1941, c. 329, § 4.
31941 REPORT, REcOmBIENDATIONS AND STUDIES OF THE LAW REVIsION CotamissioN
[Legis. Doc. (1941) No. 65 (M)] 350.4Id. at pp. 347-402. For a discussion of the previous history of the law of the seal
in New York, see Notes (1935) 21 CORNELL L. Q. 177; (1941) 26 CORNELL L. Q. 692.
5L. 1941, c. 329, § 2.6The validity of a modification or discharge attempted by a parole or simple written
agreement which was wholly or partly executed (in the latter case, to the extent
executed) was recognized in New York. McCreery v. Day, 119 N. Y. 1, 23 N. E.
198 (1890) ; McKenzie et al. v. Harrison et al., 120 N. Y. 260, 24 N. E. 458 (1890) ;
Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull, 228 N. Y._ 447, 127 N. E. 263 (1920) ; Harris v. Shorall,
230 N. Y. 343, 130 N. E. 572 (1921) ; Cammach v. Slattery, 241 N. Y. 39, 148 N. E.
781 (1925).
7Harris v. Shoral, 230 N. Y. 343, 130 N. E. 572 (1921) ; Cammach v. Slattery, 241
N. Y. 39, 148 N. E. 781 (1925). For' a general discussion relating to the modification
or discharge of a sealed instrument, see 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed., Williston
and Thompson, 1936) § 1836.8N. Y. Crv. Ppac. ACT § 342, added L. 1935, c. 708, and as amended L. 1936, c. 353.
This provision has been repealed, supra note 5.
91941 REPORT, RECOMENDATIONS AND STUDIES OF-THE LAW REvIsIoN" CoianssIoN
[Legis. Doc. (1941) No. 65 (M)] pp. 359, 401-402.
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The new statute changes the doctrine, laid down by Cardozo, J., in Beatty
v. Guggenheim Exploration Co.,' denying legal effect to a provision in a
written contract that it should only be modified or discharged in writing, the
ground for which was that, "Whenever two men contract, no limitation self
imposed can destroy their power to contract again.""-
Since the provisions of Sections 33-C of the Personal Property Law and
342 of the Civil Practice Act are not retroactive, contracts under seal made
before September 1, 1941, will continue to be governed by the previous law
of New York. In other words, written contracts, even containing a provi-
sion against oral change, made before that date, may still be changed orally.
Besides abrogating the rule of the Beatty case, Section 33-C contains three
significant provisions. (1) By its wording the statute is applicable both to
an executory oral discharge or modification of this type of contract. In this
it differs from similar statutes in other states, California,12 Oklahoma,' 3
Montana,'14 North Dakota,15 South Dakota,16 which prohibit the executory
oral modification, but which, by interpretation, permit the oral discharge of
every written contract.' 7  (2) The statute applies only to executory modi-
fications and discharges. As was true under the old law, any oral modifica-
tion or discharge will be given effect in so far as it has been executed.' 8
(3) The statute requires the executory agreement modifying or discharging
an original contract containing such a retroactive provision to be in writing
and signed by the party "against whom enforcement of the change, modi-
fication or discharge is sought." This removes, by implication, the necessity
for a sufficient consideration to support the modification or discharge, since
these requisites also comply with the provisions of Section 33 (2) of the
Personal Property Law, effective April 6, 1936, rendering enforceable with-
out consideration the written executory modification or discharge of an
existing contract. 19 It is still true, however, that every executory modifica-
'OBeatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co. et al., 225 N. Y. 380, 122 N. E. 378 (1919).
11id. at 388, 122 N. E. at 380.12 CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering 1937) § 1698.
13OKLA. STAT. ANNO. (1937) Tit. 15, § 237.
14MoNT. REv. CODE (1936) § 7569.
15N. D. Comp. L. ANNO. (1913) § 5938.
'AS. D. CODE (1939) § 10.0807.
17Pearsall v. Henry, 153 Cal. 314, 95 Pac. 154 (1907) ; Producer's Fruit Co. of Cal.
v. Goddard, 75 Cal. App. 737, 243 Pac. 686 (1925). An early Oklahoma case followed the
rule laid down in California allowing the oral substitution of a new contract [Levin v.
Hunt, 70 Okla. 63, 172 Pac. 940 (1918)] but this was not followed by later cases.
Walker v. Johnson et al., 102 Okla. 9, 227 Pac. 113 (1924) ; Wichita Flour Mills Co.
v. Guymon Equity Exchange, 150 Okla. 245, 1 P. (2d) 657 (1931). For the cause of
the California interpretation, see 6 WILLIsToN, CONTRACrs (Rev. ed.; Williston and
Thompson, 1936) § 1828.
'
8This was the rule regarding the executed modification or discharge of a sealed
instrument. See note 6 supra.
19N. Y. PEs. PROP. LAW § 33 (2) provides:
"An agreement hereafter made to change or modify, or to discharge in whole
or in part, any contract, obligation, or lease, or any mortgage or other security
interest in personal or real property, shall not be invalid because of the absence
of consideration, provided that the agreement changing, modifying or discharging
such contract, obligation, lease, mortgage or security interest, shall be in writing
1943]
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tion or discharge not within the provisions of Section 33 (2) has to be sup-
ported by a sufficient consideration.2" If consideration is present, even an
oral executory modification is still enforceable.
Section 33-C does not alter the rules governing the modification or discharge
of a contract within the Statute of Frauds. An oral agreement purporting
to vary a written contract within the Statute of Frauds is unenforceable,
except to the extent it is executed,21 unless the oral modification is of itself
a complete contract not within the statute.22 But an oral discharge of a
contract within the Statute of Frauds is enforceable, unless it would result
in a retransfer of an interest in land or in chattels which must satisfy the
statute.
23
The recent case of Zwirn v. Galento, 288 N. Y. 428, 43 N. E. (2d) 474
(1942) suggests a possible question under this new legislation. Under a
written contract made in New York, Joe Jacobs promised to obtain boxing
matches for "Two-ton" Tony Galento in consideration of Galento's promise
to render him exclusive services. It was expressly provided that the contract
should be void unless approved by the New York State Athletic Commis-
sion, and unless Jacobs be duly licensed as a manager by that body. Jacobs
procured a contract in New Jersey for a boxing exhibition between Galento
and Max Baer to be held in that state. Galento participated in this bout
although the conditions of the New York contract were not fulfilled. In a
suit by Jacobs's administrator to recover the manager's share of the purse
of the Galento-Baer contest, it was held that the complaint stated a cause
of action. The court recognized the possibility of an election against, or a
waiver of; the conditions precedent in a written contract.
If this contract had been made after September 1, 1941, the effective
date of Section 33-C, and if it had contained provisions against oral modi-
fication and discharge, would the court have reached the same result? After
the material or vital breach of a condition of a contract, the injured party
has the right either to treat the contract as broken and refuse to continue
performance, or to continue the contract despite the breach.2 These rights
are inconsistent with each other; the injured party cannot pursue both.25
and signed by the party against whom it is sought to enforce the change, modi-
fication or discharge."
The identical provision is in N. Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 279 (1). See also N. Y. DEBTOR
& CREDITOR LAW § 243 making enforceable a lease in writing without seal or consideration.20For an exposition of the law of New York on the consideration for a modification
or discharge, see Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, 231 N. Y. 196, 131 N. E. 887 (1921).
21Meyers v. Knights of Pythias, 194 App. Div. 405, 185 N. Y. Supp. 436 (1st Dep't
1920). For a general discussion of the modification or discharge of a contract within
the Statute of Frauds, see 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed., Williston and Thomp-
son, 1936) §§ 592-594.2 2RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 222. Hill v. Blake, 97 N. Y. 216 (1884);
Davidson Coal Co. v. Weston, Dodson & Co., 209 App. Div. 314, 205 N. Y. Supp. 49
(1st Dep't 1929) ; Crocker v. Page, 210 App. Div. 735, 206 N. Y. Supp. 481 (1st Dep't
1924), aff'd, 240 N. Y. 636, 148 N. E. 738 (1925).23Kieney v. Mason, 49 Barb. 254 (N. Y. 1867); Blumenthal v. Bloomingdale, 100
N, Y. 558, 3 N. E. 292 (1885) ; Clark v. Fey, 120 N. Y. 470, 24 N. E. 703 (1890).
243 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed., Williston and Thompson, 1936) § 683.25Bierce v. Huchins, 205 U. S. 340, 27 Sup. Ct. 524 (1905).
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If he repudiates the contract, no question arises under Section 33-C. If,
however, he elects to continue performance, the same contract is in effect.
The new statute, since it forbids only executory changes, would be inappli-
cable. There remains the possibility of an election against the conditions
of a contract drawn to prevent oral variation or discharge in conformity
with Section 33-C.
A waiver occurs when a party to a contract promises to perform a con-
ditional duty although the other paity fails to fulfill the conditions of the
contract. The promise, which may be express or inferred from conduct,
may be given either before or after the time the condition was to happen. 26
At common law, the seal prevented the parol modification of a contract, but
there could be a parol waiver of a condition in a sealed instrument. This
result could be supported on either of two grounds: (1) waiver is not the
same as a modification of a contract ;27 or (2) waiver amounts, in effect, to
an excuse of the condition. By analogy to the law of sealed instruments
alone, the new statute would not apply to a waiver. On the other 'hand,
the reason for the legislative protection against false claims of an oral change
is as applicable to waiver in the form of an express parol promise as to
modification. If a conceptual analysis should yield to a functional approach,
as seems desirable, the courts should construe waiver to be within Section
33-C.
As Section 33-C is applicable only to contracts governed by New York
law, the divergent rules controlling the variation or discharge of a written
instrument in other jurisdictions should be surveyed in drafting an instru-
ment which is not to be governed by New York law.29 There seem to be
at least three such rules. (1) In some states, there is no method for pre-
venting an oral agreement supported by a sufficient consideration from
modifying a written contract not within the Statute of Frauds.30 (2) In a
2 6 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrS (1932) § 88: "(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2)
and in § 93, a promise to perform all or part of an antecedent conditional duty in spite
of the non-occurrence of the condition is binding, whether the promise is made before
or after the time for the condition to occur, if performance of the condition is not a
substantial part of what was to have been given in exchange for the performance of the
antecedent duty, and if the uncertainty of the happening of the condition was not a
substantial element in inducing the formation of the contract.
"(2) If a promise such as stated in Subsection (1) is made before the time for the
occurrence of the condition has expired and the condition is some performance by the
promisee or other beneficiary of the contract, the promisor can make his duty again
subject to the condition by' giving information of his intention so to do before there
has been any substantial change of position by the promisee or beneficiary and while
there is still reasonable time to perform the condition."27Lamson & Goodnow Mfg. Co. v. Russel, 112 Mass. 387 (1873); Arbough v. Robin-
son et al., 286 S. W. 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). These cases hold that modification
results in a substituted (new) contract while the same contract is in effect after a waiver.2SFleming v. Gilbert, 3 Johns. 528 (N. Y. 1808) (parol promise before breach of
condition); McCreery et al. v. Day et al., 119 N. Y. 1, 23 N. E. 199 (1890) (dictum
to the effect that the promise may be given after the failure to perform the condition) ;
Dodsworth et al. v. Hercules Iron Works, 66 Fed. 483 (C. C. A. 6th, 1895) (promise
inferred from conduct).29It is not within the scope of this note to discuss what law will govern a contract.
This depends on the applicable conflict of laws doctrine. See generally REsTATEmENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §§ 311 et seq.
3OThis group of states includes:
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decreasing number of states, the seal retains its common law effect and
prevents any parol modification or discharge of a sealed contract except to
the extent executed.3 1 (3) Other states, as has been seen, have adopted
statutes preventing the executory oral modification but permitting the oral
discharge of any written contract.32
The new statute represents a decided advance in the law of New York.
There is need for some method whereby a party to a written agreement not
within the Statute of Frauds can protect himself against the danger of false
claims of an executory oral modification or discharge.3  The seal is not the
most appropriate method of accomplishing this end as it does not bring to
the attention of the parties the fact that they cannot subsequently modify
or discharge their original contract.34 The new statutory method, however,
by requiring an express stipulation prohibiting the oral modification or dis-
charge of the written contract, allows the contracting parties to achieve
their purpose, and yet warns them definitely of the consequences of such
a provision.3 5 Section 33-C of the Personal Property Law is a desirable
addition to the New York Law Revision Commission's program of modi-
fication of. the law of contracts.
E. T. Brown, Jr.
Legislation: Adoption of Uniform Act Governing Secured Creditors'
Dividends in Liquidation Proceedings: Change in New York Law.-
Recent efforts of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to secure the
adoption of uniform legislation with regard to payment of secured creditors'
claims on liquidation proceedings have' resulted in the enactment of Article
2-A of the New York Debtor and Creditor Law. 1 This article is substan-
1) Those states where the effect of the seal has been abolished by statute. Blag-
borne v. Hunger, 101 Mich. 375, 59 N. W. 657 (1894); Bowman v. Wright, 65 Neb.
661, 91 N. W. 580 (1902).
2) Those states where the effect of the seal has been changed by decision. Blakeslee
v. Board of Water Comrs., 121 Conn. 164, 183 Atl. 887 (1936); Tashjian v. Karp, 277
Mass. 42, 177 N. E. 816 (1931).31Masser v. Landon Operating Co., 106 Fla. 474, 145 So. 79 (1932); Wagner v.
McClay, 306 Ill. 560, 138 N. E. 164 (1923); Sachs v. Owing, 121 Va. 162, 92 S. E.
997 (1917). RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 407 takes a position contrary to these
cases. Williston suggests that the law of the states still retaining the common law
effect of the seal cannot be considered as settled unless there is a very recent case on
the point. 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed., Williston and Thompson, 1930) § 1836.3 2 See notes 12-17 mtpra.
331941 REPORT,'REcomMENDATIONS AND STUDIES OF THE LAW REVISION CoIMISSION
[Legis. Doc. (1941) No. 65 (M)] 359.341d. at pp. 401-402.351d. at 359.
1The Act effective May 18, 1942, comprises Sections 30 through 38 of the N. Y. Debtor
and Creditor Law:
§ 30. Definitions.
As used in this article, unless the context or subject matter requires otherwise:
(a) "Liquidation proceeding" includes all assignments for the benefit of creditors,
whether voluntary or by operation of law; liquidations of insolvent banks; equity
[Vol. 28
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tially identical to the Uniform Act recommended by the Commissioners for
receiverships where the subject under receivership is insolvent; and any other pro-
ceedings for distribution of assets of any insolvent debtor, whether a person, part-
nership, corporation or business association except proceedings under article sixteen
of the insurance law.
(b) "Liquidator" means any person adininistering' assets in any liquidation pro-
ceedings.
(c) "Insolvent debtor" means any insolvent person, partnership, corporation or
business association involved in a liquidation proceeding.
(d) "Secured creditor" means a creditor who has either legal or equitable security
for his debt upon any property of the insolvent debtor of a nature to be liquidated
and distributed in a liquidation proceeding, or a creditor to whom is owed a debt for
which such security is possessed by some endorser, surety, or other person secondarily
liable.
(e) "Creditor's sale" includes any sale effected by the secured creditor by judicial
process or otherwise under the terms of his contract or the applicable law for the
purpose of realizing upon his security.
§ 31. Secured creditor's claim to disclose security.
In a liquidation proceeding every secured creditor's claim against the general assets
shall disclose the nature of the security. When in an equity receivership it is deter-
mined that the subject under receivership is insolvent, secured creditors having claims
on file which do not comply with this section shall make disclosure within a time to
be fixed by the court.
§ 32. Effect of concealment.
Any secured creditor who with intent to evade the provisions of this article fails to
disclose the existence of the security shall not be entitled to receive or retain divi-
dends out of the general assets, unless he thereafter releases or surrenders to the
liquidator the security which he has failed to disclose, or unless he procures such re-
lease or surrender if the security is in the possession of an indorser; surety, or other
person secondarily liable for the insolvent debtor.
§ 33. Value of security credited upon claims.
Dividends paid to secured creditors shall be computed only upon the balance due
after the value of all security not exempt from the claims of unsecured creditors and
not released or surrendered to the liquidator, is determined and credited upon the
claim secured by it.
§ 34. Determination of value by secured creditor.
The value of assets constituting the security may be determined by one of the
following methods by the secured creditor:
(1) By collection. When the asset constituting the security is an obligation for
the payment of money, the secured creditor may determine its value by collection
or by exhausting his remedies thereon and then surrendering the obligation to the
liquidator.(2) By creditor's sale. When the asset constituting the security is something other
than an obligation for the payment of money, the secured creditor may determine
its value by creditor's sale.
"§ 2. In all liquidation proceedings pending on the effective date hereof, the
value of secured creditors' claims shall be determined in the manner provided
by this article."
§ 35. Alternative determination of value.
Where valuation under the provisions of section thirty-four is impracticable or
would cause undue delay, the court, upon petition by either the secured creditor or
the liquidator, may order the value of the security determined by any of the follow-
ing methods:
(1) By compromise, if the secured creditor and the liquidator agree upon a value.
The liquidator may redeem such assets by payment of the agreed value, if authorized
by the court.
(2) By litigation, through proceedings in the liquidation proceeding. The liquidator
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nation-wide adoption in 1939.2
The desire for uniformity is more easily understood when viewed with ref-
erence to the present confusion in the law of various American jurisdictions.
The problem is one of determining the extent to which a secured creditor
may prove his claim against the assets of his insolvent debtor. Four divergent
views exist :3
(1) The Bankruptcy rule4-- Face of the claim less the value of the collateral.
(2) The Maryland rule -Balance owing when each dividend is declared
less only amounts actually realized from collateral.
(3) The Illinois rule"-Balance owing at the time the creditor presents
his claim without deduction for collateral held by him.
may redeem such assets by paying the value so determined, if authorized by the
court.
(3) By liquidator's sale of the assets which, when completed and approved by
the court, shall pass to the purchaser good title, free and clear of all liens of the
secured creditor, such liens to be transferred to the- proceeds of the sale. The order
of the sale may be either
(a) Conditional, requiring the sale to be made by the liquidator only if the se-
cured creditor does not complete a determination by collection or creditor's sale as
set forth in section thirty-four of this article within a time fixed by the court; or
(b) Absolute, requiring the sale to be made by the liquidator within the time fixed
by the court.
§ 36. Exempt security not credited.
When any creditor has legal or equitable security upon assets which are exempt
from process for the satisfaction of unsecured debts and are duly claimed as exempt
by the insolvent debtor, the value of such security shall not be credited upon the
claim. Amounts realized by the creditor from such security after liquidation pro-
ceedings are begun shall be disregarded in computing dividends, unless the divi-
dend so computed exceeds the sum actually owing upon the claim, in which event only
the amount owing shall be paid.
§ 37. Constitutionality.
If any provision of this article or the application thereof to any person or circum-
stances is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications
thereof which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and
to this end the provisions of this article are declared to be severable.
§ 38. Uniformity of interpretation.
This article shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general pur-
pose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
Noted (1943) 12 FORDHAm L. REV. 77.2NAT'L CONF. COMMR'S UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK (1939) 214.3Actually, a fifth rule exists but is confined in operation to Kentucky. There a secured
creditor is entitled to dividends along with unsecured creditors only after the latter have
received a percentage of the dividends equal to that percentage of a secured creditor's
claim covered by collateral. See Bank of Louisville v. Laughbridge, 92 Ky. 472, 18 S.
W. 1 (1892).4This rule was first pronounced in England in the case of Wright v. Simpson, 6 Ves.
714 (Ch. 1802). Thirty-five years later Mason v. Bogg, 2 Myl. & C. 443 (Ch. 1837)
overruled the Wright case. The bankruptcy rule was reinstated in England by legisla-
tion applying it expressly to liquidations in Chancery. Supreme Court of Judicature Act
1873, 36 & 37 Vrcr., c. 66, § 25, as amended by Section 10 of the Supreme Court of
Judicature Act, 1875, 38 & 39 VicT., c. 77. For the statement of the rule in America, see
the National Bankruptcy Act § 57 (e), 11 U. S. C. § 93 (1938).5Third National Bank v. Lanahan, 66 Md. 461, 7 Ati. 615 (1886).6 Bates v. Paddock, 118 Ill. 524, 9 N. E. 257 (1886).
[Vol. 28
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(4) The Chancery rule 7-- Balance owing at the time of the declaration of
insolvency without deduction for collateral.
The Illinois and Maryland rules still prevail in some jurisdictions.8 The
chancery rule, prior to legislation, had greater numerical support in America
and is followed in the federal courts except in bankruptcy proceedings.9 It
has, however, been the subject of severe criticism and has been completely re-
pudiated in England where it originated.10 Recent trends in legislation favor
the bankruptcy rule."x
The evolution of the chancery rule in New York and the gradual legisla-
tive encroachments upon its operation culminating in the adoption of the
bankruptcy rule as expressed in Article 2-A are typical of a changing legis-
lative and judicial concept. New York adopted the chancery rule in 1867 to
govern assignments for the benefit of creditors.' 2 It was subsequently extended
to cover the distribution of receivership assets on corporate insolvency. 13
Other stages in its development were marked by decisions applying it to
liquidation proceedings of an insolvent trust company' 4 and insolvent de-
cedents' estates,' 5 and to the distribution of funds of a dairy company held
by the Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets. 16
While the judiciary was thus establishing the rule, the legislature was re-
7The case of Mason v. Bogg, supra note 4, introduced the chancery rule into England.
Its stay, however, was short-lived. English legislation abolishing the rule and substi-
tuting the bankruptcy rule as one of universal application has already been mentioned.
It should be noted that Section 10 of the Judicature Act, 1875 has been replaced by the
Administration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 GEO. V, c. 23, § 34. The federal courts adopted
the chancery rule following a five to four decision in the celebrated case of Merrill v.
National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U. S. 131, 19 Sup. Ct. 360 (1899).8First Nat. Bank v. Green, 221 Ala. 201, 128 So. 394 (1930); Re Butterman, 196 Iowa
633, 195 N. W. 188 (1923) (following the Maryland rule); State ex rel Rankin v.
Yellowstone Bank and T. Co., 75 Mont. 43, 243 Pac. 813 (1925) (applying the Illinois
rule). See Notes L. R. A. 1918B 1024; (1935) 94 A. L. R. 468 for a discussion of all
four rules and a collection of cases applying them.
9 GLENN, LIQUIDATION (1935) § 529.
'
0 See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White in Merrill v. National Bank of Jackson-
ville, 173 U. S. 131, 147, 19 Sup. Ct. 360, 367 (1899) ; Clark, Proof by Secured Creditors
in Insolvency and Receivership Proceedings (1920) 15 ILL. L. REV. 171; Hanson, The
Secured Creditor's Share of an Insolvent Estate (1936) 34 MIcH. L. REv. 309, 320;
GLENN, LIQUIDATION (1935) § 530. See note 4 supra.
"lCommissioners' Prefatory Note, 9 UNIFORm LAws ANNOTATED 21.
12Midgeley v. Slocomb, 2 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 275 (Sup. Ct. 1867) ; Jervis v. Smith, 7
Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 217 (Sup. Ct. 1869).
13People v. Remington, 121 N. Y. 328, 24 N. E. 793 (1890). After expressly recogniz-
ing the bankruptcy rule as operative in many jurisdicrions, the court said at p. 333, 794:
"To administer in cases of insolvency coming within the jurisdiction of courts
of equity, by analogy with the modes of bankruptcy cdurts is not required, and such
precedents are not to be deemed as affecting any change in the rules established by
courts of equity, for the marshalling and distribution of assets."
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Land Estates, 110 F. (2d) 617, 619 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
'
4McGrath ,. Carnegie Trust Co., 221 N. Y. 92, 116 N. E. 787 (1917).
'
51t re Vicinus' Estate, 159 Misc. 903, 290 N. Y. Supp. 20 (Surr. Ct. 1936) ; In re
Cooke's Estate, 147 Misc. 528, 264 N. Y. Supp. 336 (Surr. Ct. 1933) ; Matter of Kearns,
139 Misc. 877, 249 N. Y. Supp. 340 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
IcAndes Co-operative Dairy Co. v. Baldwin, 238 Apn. Div. 726. 266 N. Y. Supp. 18
(3d Dept. 1933), aff'd without opinion, 263 N. Y. 578, 189 N. E. 705 (1933).
1943]
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stricting its application. In 1914, an amendment to the New York Debtor
and Creditor Law substituted the bankruptcy rule in assignments for the
benefit of creditors. 17 Again in 1932 the legislature made the bankruptcy
rule applicable to liquidation proceedings of insolvent insurance companies.' 8
This change was effected by the passage of Article 16 of the New York
Insurance Law. Virtually all mortgage guaranty companies in New York
are organized under the Insurance Law. The amendment, therefore, resulted
in a widespread use of the bankruptcy rule of distribution in New York even
prior to the adoption of the Uniform Act.' 9
In 1933, New York mortgage moratorium legislation was enacted recogniz-
ing the right of a debtor sued on a mortgage-secured debt to set off the fair
market value of the mortgaged property.20 This right of set-off reduces the
creditor's claim by an amount equal to the value of the security held by him.
This is exactly -the result achieved under the bankruptcy rule.
In 1941, the bankruptcy rule of distribution was made applicable to funds
of an insolvent decedent's estate. 21
-Section 33 is the ,heart of the new Act and restates the bankruptcy rule.
It provides that:
"Dividends to secured creditors shall be computed only upon the bal-
ance due after the value of all security not exempt from the claims of
unsecured creditors and not released or surrendered to the liquidator is
determined and credited upon the claim secured by it."
It is apparent from the broad statutory definition of "liquidation proceed-
ings" 22 that the legislature has sought to make the rule applicable to all types
of such proceedings and to eliminate the chancery rule in New York. It
should be noted, however, that proceedings under Article 16 of the Insurance
Law are expressly exempted from the operation of the new Act.23 Legislation
passed in 1932 had already enacted the bankruptcy rule of distribution to
govern such proceedings.24
The express mention of insolvent decedents' estates which appears in the
draft of the Uniform Commissioners has been omitted from the. New York
Act, Adoption of the bankruptcy rule in the field of insolvent decedents'
estates at the 1941 session accounts for the failure of the legislature expressly
17N. Y. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW § 15(8), L. 1914, c. 360, Matter of Vietor, 101
Misc. 308, 166 N. Y. Supp. 1012 (Sup. Ct. 1917), aff'd without opinion, 183 App. Div.
883, 171 N. Y. Supp. 1102 (1st Dept. 1918), 224 N. Y. 707, 121 N. E. 896 (1918).
18N. Y. INsuRANcE LAW § 544(6), L. 1932, c. 191, adding § 425 to the Insurance
Law of 1909.
'
9 Hamberg v. Guaranteed Mortgage Co. of New York, 38 N. Y. S. (2d) 165 (Sup.
Ct. 1942).2 0N. Y. Civ PR~c. AcT § 1083-b, Prudential Ins. Co. v. Land Estates, 110 F. (2d)
617, 619 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940). The emergency period has been extended to July 1, 1943,
L. 1941,. c. 625.2 1SuRROGATE'S COURT AcT § 212 (4), L. 1941, c. 425, In re Bernard's Estate, 177 Misc.
712, 714, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 777, 780 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
12 2 N. Y. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW § 30(a) (1942).
231bid.
24 See note 18 supra.
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to include this type of proceeding in the new Act.2 5
Sections 34 and 35 provide a statutory method for determining the value
of a creditor's security. Where the security is an obligation to pay money,
the creditor may collect it or exhaust his remedies thereon. Other types of
security may be sold on creditor's sale. If these methods prove impracticable,
the court upon petition of a secured creditor or liquidator may order a deter-
mination of value (1) by compromise between the secured creditor and the
liquidator, or (2) by litigation ancillary to the liquidation proceedings, or
(3) by compelling a liquidator's sale of the assets which, when approved by
the court, passes clear title to the purchaser.
No similar provisions are to be found either in the Chandler Act 26 or in
previous New York legislation enacting the bankruptcy rule in this state.
The computation of the value of a secured creditor's collateral has not fol-
lowed any fixed pattern.2 7 The present act furnishes a simple and flexible
formula for such a determination and should greatly facilitate distribution
of assets on liquidation and guarantee to creditors, both secured and un-
secured, an equitable participation in dividends.
But it is questionable whether the provisions for valuation of a creditor's
security may be extended to include distribution of assets of an insolvent
decedent's estate, even assuming that the present Act does include such dis-
tribution within its compass. Such an extension would involve an obvious
conflict with the Surrogate's Court Act. Section 35(3) of the Irew Act pro-
vides that the value of a creditor's security may be determined by a liquidator's
sale of the assets. The difficulty arises where the creditor holds a mortgage
on real estate owned by the decedent. Section 234 of the Surrogate's Court
Act provides that real property of the decedent may be sold:
"For the payment of debts of the decedent . . . excepting mortgage
liens existing thereon at the time of his death."28 (Italics added)
This section expressly denies to the surrogate the power to authorize an
executor or administrator to sell real property for the purpose of paying
debts when the security consists of a mortgage.29 There is no reason why this
same restriction should not apply to a sale by the liquidator. In the distribu-
tion of an insolvent decedent's estate, the duties of a liquidator as defined
by Article 2-A are identical to those performed by an executor or adminis-
trator.30 Yet, the new Act authorizes the court to compel the liquidator to sell
the security. Such a result, it is submitted, is antagonistic to the clear pro-
hibition against sale contained in Section 234 of the Surrogate's Court Act.
The exclusion from the operation of Article 2-A of proceedings under Sec-
tion 16 of the Insurance Law is likewise unfortunate. These proceedings in-
25See note 20 supra.
26MATTHEW BENDER AND CO., CHANDLER AcT 1938, ANALYSIS OF CHANGES (1938).
2 7 Matter of Vietor, 101 Misc. 308, 319, 166 N. Y. Supp. 1012, 1019 (1917) (decision
under Debtor and Creditor Law § 15(8) ; Matter of New York Title and Mortgage Co.,
277 N. Y .66, 13 N. E. (2d) 41 (1938).2 8SURROGATE'S COURT AcT § 234(1), Matter of Perkins, 122 Misc. 593, 204 N. Y. Supp.
667 (Surr. Ct. 1924). Noted in (1940) 124 A. L. R. 793.2 9 Matter of Perkins, 122 Misc. 594, 596, 204 N. Y. Supp. 667, 670 (Surr. Ct. 1924).
30N. Y. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW § 30(b).
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lude liquidation of insurance companies and mortgage guaranty companies.
The application of the statutory formula for security evaluation set out in
Article 2-A is particularly desirable in such proceedings. 31 Excepting these
proceedings from the operation of Article 2-A will decrease substantially the
effectiveness of the enactment. An amendment incorporating into the Insur-
ance Law the procedure with regard to secured claims and the rights, reme-
dies, and duties of secured creditors as set forth in Article 2-A seems
desirable.
Finally, it is suggested that subdivision 8 of Section 15 of the Debtor and
Creditor Law dealing with assignments for the benefit of creditors be stricken
out and the court be given express power:
"To apply the provisions of Article 2-A of this Act governing secured
creditors' dividends in liquidating proceedings. '3 2
The new Act subjects the secured creditor to the duty of disclosing his
security; the penalty for failure to do so prohibits the creditor from receiv-
ing or retaining dividends out of the general assets.3 3 This provision likewise
has no counterpart in the Chandler Act or in other state legislation enacting
the bankruptcy rule.
Section 36 provides that:
"When -any creditor has legal or equitable security upon assets which
are exempt from process for the satisfaction of unsecured debts and are
duly claimed as exempt by the insolvent debtor, the value of such se-
curity shall not be credited upon the claim. Amounts realized by the
creditor from such security after liquidation proceedings are begun shall
be disregarded in computing dividends, unless the dividend so computed
exceeds the sum actually owing upon the claim, in which event only
the amount owing shall be paid."
This provision is a statutory recognition of the well-established doctrine that
a secured creditor has a valid lien on the assets of his debtor to the extent of
his security. To disregard amounts. realized from collateral, when computing
dividends due the secured creditor, does not prejudice the position of un-
secured creditors, since by the very wording of the section, the secured creditor
cannot receive dividends in excess of the sum actually owing on his claim.
3 4
John S. De Jose
31It is only necessary that the reader take a casual glance at the annotations to § 544(6)
of the N. Y. Insurance Law (McKinney's). The litigation under this section is abundant
and security evaluation is an ever-present item.
_
32There is no doubt that the provisions of the new act do govern assignments for the
benefit of creditors but substitution of this paragraph for the present subdivision 8 of
Section 15 would be a step toward clarification.
33 N. Y. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW §§ 31, 32.34To date, four other states have adopted the Uniform Act. They are: (1) Indiana-
IND. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1942) tit. 31 §§ 201-210, L. 1941, c. 50; Legis. (1941) 17 IND.
L. J. 165; (2) New Jersey-N. J. S. A. § 2:61 A-1 to 2:61 A-11, L. 1941, c. 80; (3)
South Dakota-L. 1941, c. 162; (4) Wisconsin-Wis. STAT. 1941 § 128.25. In Wisconsin
and Indiana the liquidator is prohibited from selling security on real estate of an in-
solvent decedent's estate.
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Limitation of Actions: Effect of oral promise not to plead the statute
of limitations.- An oral promise not to plead the statute of limitations is gen-
erally construed as a new promise to pay the debt.' Many states have statutes'
providing that no acknowledgment or new promise shall be sufficient evidence
of a new or continuing contract to extend the statute of limitations unless it
is in writing and signed by the party to be charged. 2 Application of these
statutes is difficult where a debtor induces a pressing creditor to forbear by
promising orally that he will not plead the statute of limitations. Should the
requirement of writing be applied in every case, or should oral evidence be
admitted where the circumstances are extenuating?
The New York decisions represent the minority view which clings to a
literal interpretation and rejects evidence of an oral promise not to plead
the statute of limitations.3 They consider such a rule a legislative device to
insure the operation of the statute of limitations as a statute of repose. Prior
to this statute, the most casual reference to a debt was construed to be an
acknowledgment or new promise sufficient to toll the statute. Ingenious meth-
ods were employed to trick unwary debtors out of their statutory defense. To
protect the. debtor against unscrupulous creditors and to assist the courts in
sifting out nala fide litigants, the statute was enacted requiring evidence of
the new promise to be in writing.4 The foremost New York decision, Shapley
v. Abbott,5 was based on this historical argument. There, the court rejected
'RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 86 (2) (c).2Forty states have adopted statutes to this effect. See: ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1940)) tit. 7, § 40; ARiz. CODE ANN. (1940) § 29-303; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Buck, 1937)
§ 8943; CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. (Deering, 1937) § 360; COLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935)
c. 102, § 26; CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5611; D. C. CODE (1940) § 12-305; FLA. CoMoP.
GEN. LAWs ANN. (Skillman, 1927) § 4650; GA. CODE ANN. (Skillman, 1936) § 3-901;
IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 5-238; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 2-610; IOWA CODE
(1939) § 11018; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (1935) § 60-312; ME RFV. STAT. (1930) c. 95,
§ 104; MASS. ANN. LAWS (Michie, 1933) v. 9, c. 260, § 13; MIcH. STAT. ANN. (Hender-
son, 1938) § 27-613; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9204; Miss. CODE ANN. (1930) § 2318;
Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 1035; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. (Anderson and McFarland, 1935)
§ 9062; NEB. Comp. STAT. (Kyle, Supp. 1941) § 20-216; NEv. ComP. LAWS (Hillyer,
1929) § 8542; N. J. STAT. ANN. (1939) § 2:24-9; N. M. STAT. ANN. (1941) § 27-115;
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) § 416; N. D. Comp. LAws (1913) § 7394; N. Y. Crv.
PRAc. Act (Gilbert-Bliss, 1942) § 59; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938) § 11223;
OKA. STAT. ANN. (1937) tit. 12, § 101; ORE. Comp. LAWs ANN. (1939) § 1-222; S. C. CODE(1942) § 368; S. D. CODE (1939) § 33.0213; TFx. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Vernon. 1941) art.
5539; UTAH REV. STAr. ANN. (1933) § 104-2-45; VT. PuB. LAWs (1934) § 1666; VA. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1942) § 5821; WASH. Rrv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 176; W. VA.
CODE ANN. Michie, 1937) § 5400; Wis. STAT. (1941) § 330.42; Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN.
(Courtright, 1931) § 89-421. With the exception of the Connecticut statute which applies
only to representatives of deceased persons, these statutes contain substantially the same
provisions.
3Shapley v. Abbott, 42 N. Y. 443 (1870) ; Miller v. McKnight, 263 App. Div. 1024, 33
N. Y. S. (2d) 449 (3d Dep't 1942); Wakulaw v. State Bank, 214 App. Div. 673, 212
N. Y. Supp. 733 (1st Dep't 1925).4The statutes in question were derived from Lord Tenterden's Act. 9 GFo. IV, c. 14
(1828). For an historical discussion of these statutes, see, Albachten v. Bradley, 212
Minn. 359, 3 N. W. (2d) 783 (1942); Olson v. Dahl, 99 Minn. 433, 109 N. W. 1001
(1906); Van Keuren v. "Parmelee, 2 N. Y. 523 (1849); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Wil-
liston and Thompson, Rev. ed., 1936) § 164.
542 N. Y. 443 (1870). This decision amounted to a reversal of the original New York
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each of the plaintiff's four theories of recovery: (1) As an acknowledgment
of the debt, the defendant's promise was unenforceable because not in writing;
(2) As a completely new contract, it was invalid for lack of consideration;
(3) Nor, could it be ' waiver because the defense had not accrued to the
defendant at the time it was made, and as a promise to waive, it was unenforce-
able without consideration; and (4) There was no estoppel in the absence of
misrepresentation of past or present fact. The court declared that a promise
of future action could not constitute an estoppel where the facts were fully
known to both parties.0 To allow an estoppel in such cases would controvert
the historical purpose of the statute.
The supreme court of Minnesota reached the opposite conclusion in the
recent case of Albachten v. Bradley.7 The plaintiff, payee of a note made by
the defendant, demanded payment shortly before the expiration of the period
of limitations. The defendant assured the plaintiff that he would lose nothing
by waiting until Thanksgiving, three months after the period expired.8 When
the plaintiff sought payment after the agreed time, the defendant's answer was
"try and collect." In his action brought more than seven years after the
maturity of the note, the plaintiff sought to avoid the bar of the statute of
limitations by showing his oral agreement to extend the time of payment. The
court admitted the evidence. After considering and rejecting the New York
decisions, the Minnesota court applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel.0
The court reasoned that the debtor by his promise intentionally induced -his
creditor to forbear his action, and the creditor relied on the promise to his
detriment. The debtor, therefore, was estopped to invoke as a defense the
oral nature of his promise.
The disparity of opinion demonstrated in these decisions is the result of
differing ideas as to the function of the statute. Admitting, as did the New
York decisions, that the policy of the statutes is one of repose, the Minnesota
court refused to allow that consideration to override basic principles of equity
by permitting a party to found a claim on his own 'wrong. It viewed the statute
essentially ds a Statute of Frauds to alter the character of proof required for
a new promise, and not as changing the substance of the common law.' 0
By taking this approach, the court was not enforcing an oral contract in com-
plete disregard of the statute, but in effect, was construing the statute as in-
applicable to this case. An English court confronted by a similar problem
view, as expressed in Utica Ins. Co. v. Bloodgood, 4 Wend. 652 (N. Y. 1830) and Gaylord
v. Van Looit, 15 Wend. 308 (N. Y. 1836).
6Quincey & Co., Arbitrage v. Cities Service Co., 156 Misc. 83, 282 N. Y. Supp. 294 (Sup.
Ct. 1935), aff'd without opinion, 253 App. Div. 719, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 654 (1st Dep't 1937) ;
In re Watson, 177 Misc. 308, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 577 (Surr. Ct. 1941) ; Parsons v. Lipe,
et al., 158 Misc. 32, 286 N. Y. Supp. 60 (Sup. Ct. 1933) ; Pratt v. Ano, 7 App. Div. 494,
40 N. Y. Supp. 229 (4th Dep't 1896).7The Minnesota court interpreted the defendant's assurance as a promise not to plead
the statute of limitations, which was equivalent to a new promise to pay. Accord:
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 86(2) Cc).
8212 Minn. 359, 3 N. W. (2d) 783 (1942).
9 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 139; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90; Note (1941)
36 ILL. L. REv. 187.
'OMcLearn v. Hill, 276 Mass. 519, 177 N. E. 617 (1931); R. H. Stearns Co. v. United
States, 291 U. S. 54, 54 Sup. Ct. 325 (1933).
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reached the same result upon the analysis that "the matter has advanced be-
yond the stage of contract; and the equities which arise out of the stage which
it has reached cannot be adrhinistered unless the contract is regarded.""' After
measuring these equities, which included the unenforceable oral promise, the
Minnesota court concluded that the refuge ,of a statute to prevent fraud must
be denied to one who sought to gain its protection by deceitful acts.
Recent developments in New York law tend to undermine the rationale
of the Shapley v. Abbott decision. Its collapse may be imminent. In the first
place, oral contracts within the statute of frauds have been enforced .where
one party relied thereon to his detriment.' 2 Such a statute is also a statute
of repose but it is not an "asylum of escape"' 3 for the wrongdoer. The instant
statute requiring written evidence closely resembles, in its operative effect, a
Statute of Frauds. The same reasoning should apply to it. The second prin-
cipal support of the Shapley decision, viz., that estoppel can be predicated only
on misrepresentation of past or present fact, has been weakened by partial rec-
ognition of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 14 New York courts have lim-
ited this doctrine to charitable subscription cases-with justifiable caution,
where the ticklish problem of substituted consideration is involved. 15 But
the problem arising from oral promises to extend the statute of limitations
is not so perplexing. The creditor does not allege that his reliance and detri-
ment are consideration for the defendant's promise. The common law has
long recognized that additional consideration is not necessary to support a
promise to extend the statute of limitations.1 The plaintiff invokes the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel to extend to this fact situation the elementary
principles of estoppel which prevent a party from denying words spoken
intentionally to induce another to act to his harm.
Notwithstanding the admitted reluctance of the New York courts to extend
the doctrine of promissory estoppel, they could find considerable support for
overruling the Shapley decision in the older doctrine of estoppel in pais.
Paralleling the cases under the aegis of Shapley v. Abbott, which traditionally
insist on misrepresentation of fact, there is a line of New York decisions which
find an estoppel iL the absence of misrepresentation of past or present fact.17
'
1 Maddison v. Alderson, 8 App. Cas. 467, 476 (1883).
'
21mperator Realty Co. v. Tull, 228 N. Y. 447, 127 N. E. 263 (1920); Holden v.
Efficient Craftsmen Corp., 234 N. Y. 437, 138 N. E. 85 (1923) ; Harris v. Shorall, 230
N. Y. 343, 130 N. E. 572 (1921) ; Thompson v. Poor, 147 N. Y. 402, 42 N. E. 13 (1895).
'
3Cardozo, C.J., in Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull, supra note 12.
14Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E.
173 (1927); I. & I. Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, 251 App. Div. 550, 296 N. Y. Supp.
'757 (1st Dep't 1937), aff'd, 276 N. Y. 427, 12 N. E. (2d) 532 (1938).
'OQuincey Co., Arbitrage Corp. v. Cities Service Co., 156 Misc. 83, 282 N. Y. Supp.
294 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd without opinion, 253 App. Div. 719, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 654 (1st
Dep't 1937) ; Comfort v. McCorkle, 149 Misc. 826, 268 N. Y. Supp. 192 (Sup. Ct. 1933) ;
Harvey v. Morgan & Co., 166 Misc. 455, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 520 (N. Y. C. Ct. 1937),
rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 636 (App. Term 1938), aff'd iner.,
260 App. Div. 873, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 844 (2d Dep't 1940).
161 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 184, 162, 143; Note (1938) 23 CORNELL L. Q. 607.17Witherell v. Kelly, 195 App. Div. 227, 187 N. Y. Supp. 43 (2d Dep't 1921); The
Continental National Bank v. The National Bank of the Commonwealth, 50 N. Y. 575
(1872) ; In re Tuozzolo's Will, 145 Misc. 485, 259 N. Y. Supp. 542 (Surr. Ct. 1932) ;
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The rationale of these cases is as just as it is simple. "The doctrine of estoppel
is applied with respect to representations of a party, to prevent their operating
as a fraud upon one'who has been led to rely upon them."' 8 No distinction
is drawn between factual and promissory misrepresentation. 9 The scoundrel
who misleads innocent parties by promises deserves no greater immunity than
the one who deceives them with misrepresentations. Recognition of this ele-
mentary proposition would be justified in New York, in view of the general
disapproval of the Shapley decision, 20 and the disintegration of its principal
arguments.
2 1
Constance Knowles Eberhardt
Torts: Liability of municipaliiy for injuries occurring in public parks.--
In Clark v. City of Buffalo, 288 N. Y. 62, 41 N, E. (2d) 459 (1942), an
action was brought against the City of Buffalo for the injury of a child
caused by a piece of glass picked -up and thrown by another child without
warning or cause in a public park. The city was alleged to have been negli-
gent in that it, having permitted a concessionaire to sell within the park
drinks in bottles which, when emptied, were thrown upon the ground and
broken, neglected to remove the broken glass and failed properly to super-
vise children playing in the park. The trial court allowed a recovery which
the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed. The Court of Appeals per-
mitted an appeal and reversed, holding: First, that a city is not an insurer of
the safety of persons using its park facilities, but that it is under a duty
to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of its parks and in the super-
vision of their use by the public; and, second, that the city was not negligent,
as it had provided adequate supervision, but that the sole cause of the
injury was the sudden, impulsive, and unpredictable act of another child,
who made use of a handy missile which was not inherently dangerous.
That municipal liability in tort depends upon the nature of the function
involved is well established. If the function is corporate, the municipal
Firestone v. Miroth Const. Co., Inc., 215 App. Div. 564, 214 N. Y. Supp. 239 (1st Dep't
1926); Vandeweghe v. City of New York, 150 Misc. 815, 270 N. Y. Supp. 570 (Sup. Ct.
1934); Town of Brookhaven v. Smith, 118 N. Y. 634, 23 N. E. 1002 (1890) ; Hartford
Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Oles, 152 Misc. 876, 274 N. Y. Supp. 349 (Sup. Ct. 1934).5lInsurance Co. v. Mowry, 96 U. S. 544, 547 (1877). These words were adopted by
the New York court in Witherell v. Kelly, 195 App. Div. 227, 231 187 N. Y. Supp. 43,
46 (2d Dep't 1921)..
'9A federal court interpreting the Virginia statute, which expressly authorized an
estoppel whenever the new promise "would operate as a fraud," found that an act of
bad faith was "fraud" within the meaning of the statute, although all the elements of
technical fraud were not present. Tucker v. Owen, 94 F. (2d) 49 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938)
Note (1938) 23 CORNELL L. Q. 607.20Albachten v. Bradley, 212 Minn. 359, 3 N. W. (2d) 783 (1942); Tucker v. Owen,
94 F. (2d) 49 (C. C. A. 4th,' 1938) ; Holman v. Omaha & C. B. Ry. & Bridge Co., 117
Iowa 268, 90 N. W. 833 (1902); Schroeder v. yroung, 161 U. S. 334, 16 Sup. Ct. 512
(1896); Cecil v. Henderson, 121 N. C. 244, 28 S. E. 481 (1897); State Trust Co. v,
Sheldon, 68 Vt. 259, 35 Atl. 178 (1896) ; Little v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 123 Mass.
380 (1877) ; Quick v. Corlies, 39 N. J. L. 11 (1876).21See notes 12 and 13 supra.
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corporation may be held liable; if the function is governmental, immunity
from liability follows as of course.' When an attempt is made to charac-
terize some particular function as either governmental or corporate, the
difficulties in the application of the rule become apparent. Most jurisdictions,
when dealing with cases involving municipal liability for torts occurring at
public parks, playgrounds, bathing places, zoos, and the like, have found
these functions to be governmental and thus exempted the municipality
from liability.2 A strong minority,3 however, including New York,4 has
found that only a corporate function' is involved. In the principal case, the
trial court ruled at the beginning of the trial that the question of govern-
mental function was not involved-so clear is the rule in New York. The
majority rule is riddled with exceptions. Even under it, the courts have
been able to work out several theories of municipal liability: (1) Nuisance ;5
(2) Maintenance for profit;6 (3) Some other ground of municipal liability
(ozg., injury resulting from a defect in a park street or sidewalk) ;7 and, in
the case of property damage alone, (4) The broad legal principle that no
one is permitted to use his own property so as to invade the property rights
of another. 8 It seems to be generally conceded by the courts that the munici-
pality should not escape liability when actually at fault. Under the minority
rule, proper results are achieved through the application of ordinary rules
of negligence. Under the majority rule, the courts have created exceptions to
accomplish substantial justice. Legal writers have consistently urged that
liability be imposed for all tort injuries which are the fault of the munici-
pality.9 The courts have never gone that far, probably because they felt
'Bailey et al. v. The Mayor &c. of New York, 3 Hill 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669 (N. Y.
1842).2Kellar v. City of Los Angeles, 179 Cal. 605, 178 Pac. 505 (1919); Hannon v. The
City of Waterbury, 106 Conn. 13, 136 At. 876 (1926) ; Gebhardt v. The Village of
LaGrange Park, 354 Ill. 234, 188 N. E. 372 (1933) ; Bolster v. City of Lawrence, 225
Mass. 387, 114 N. E. 722 (1917); St. John v. City of St. Paul, 179 Minn. 12, 228
N. W. 170 1929) ; Kuchler v. N. J. and N. Y. R. Co., 104 N. J. L. 333, 140 Atl.
329 (1928) ; City of Mingo Junction v. Sheline, 130 Ohio St. 34, 196 N. E. 897 (1935);
Virovatz v. City of Cudahy, 211 Wis. 357, 247 N. W. 341 (1933).
3City of Kokomo v. Loy, 185 Ind. 18, 112 N. E. 994 (1916); Honoman v. City of
Philadelphia, 322 Pa. 535, 185 Atl. 750 (1936).4 1n Augustine v. Town of Brant, 249 N. Y. 198, 163 N. E. 732 (1928), the court
in referring to the unreported opinion in Edinger v. City of Buffalo, 213 N. Y. 674, 107
N. E. 1076 (1914), said: "The establishment of town parks is not a public duty im-
posed upon theetown and the town does not act as an agent of the state when it avails
itself of the privilege of maintaining them. . . . When the town assumes the authority
to own and maintain parks, it goes outside the political power of a local subdivision
of the State to engage in a quasi private undertaking. No substantial difference exists
between towns and cities as to the theory of corporate liability for negligence in this
regard .... The modern tendency is against the rule of nonliability.... The establish-
ment of a town park may incidentally benefit the public health, but that fact does not
make the acts of the town in maintaining the park the exercise of a governmental
function."5Hoffman v. City of Bristol, 113 Conn. 386, 155 AtI. 499 (1931).6Rome v. London & L. Indem. Co., 181 La. 630, 160 So. 121 (1935).7Ackeret v. Minneapolis, 129 Minn. 190, 151 N. W. 976 (1915).
8Boise Development Co. v. Boise City, 3ff Idaho 675, 167 Pac. 1032 (1917).9Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924) 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129, 229, (1926)
36 YALE L. J. 1; Symposium on Municipal Tort Liability (1940) 5 LEGAL NOTES ON
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 351.
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that the imposition of such a general liability is properly a legislative
function.'0 The courts have continued to maintain at least the shell of the
old distinction between governmental and corporate functions, and, while it
is not likely that this distinction will be openly abandoned in the immediate
future, yet there can be little doubt that ultimately, either by decision or
statute, municipalities will be liable for their negligence."-
The New York law in this field is well settled. New York has long re-
garded the maintenance of parks, beaches, playgrounds, zoos, and the like,
as a corporate function. 1 2 No statute defines the extent of municipal lia-
bility. "It makes no difference whether these 'facilities are either created or
maintained under a statute or not; if the municipality extends such facilities
to the public, it is liable for its negligence. 13 The rules of negligence and
contributory negligence apply.'4 A participant in, or spectator of, a game
assumes all the risks of that game, and the municipality cannot be held.'
'°Scibilia v. City of Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549, 124 AtI. 273 (1924).
116 McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. rev. 1936) § 2850:
"In view of the tendency of late decisions and the development of the law on this
subject, the rule will ultimately prevail that in maintaining parks, playgrounds and
like recreations, the city is performing a local function for its people and it should be
held liable on the same basis as a private person or corporation."
12See note 4 supra. See also Curcio v. City of New York, 275 N. Y. 20, 9 N. E.
(2d) 760 (1937) ; Peterson v. City of New York, 267 N. Y. 204, 196 N. E. 27 (1935);
VanDyke v. City of Utica, 203 App. Div. 26, 196 N. Y. Supp. 277 (4th Dep't 1922);
Minchin v. City of Utica, 259 App. Div. 477, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 335 (4th Dep't 1940).
Two cases warrant special consideration. In Willcox v. County of Erie, 252 App. Div.
20, 297 N. Y. Supp. 287 (4th Dep't 1937) the Appellate Division found non-liability on
the basis of governmental function. The Court of Appeals affirmed [277 N. Y. 604,
14 N. E. (2d) 184 (1938)1 solely on t&e ground that there was no evidence of negli-
gence. It is probably safe to disregard the decision of the Appellate Division. The
other case is Whittaker v. Village of Franklinville, 265 N. Y. 11, 191 N. E. 716 (1934).
In this case, a toy cannon, being fired by private individuals on the Fourth of July
in a public park, exploded and injured the plaintiff, who was walking down an adjoining
street. The court held that a municipal corporation is not bound to take affirmative
action to prevent acts of persons in a park, maintained by it for the use of the public
and not for profit, wherefrom people on an adjoining street may be injured. It also
held that passive acquiescence in a nuisance outside of a street which caused injury to
one using the street was not sufficient to impose liability upon the municipality. This
is a very puzzling case. The court's reasoning is hazy. McQuillin cites the case for
the proposition that maintenance of a park is a governmental function, 6 McQuILLIN,
THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL COIORATIONS (2d ed. rev. 1936) § 2850, n. 71. The case
can probably be best explained on the giound of non-liability for passively allowing
nuisances created by others to continue on land adjoining public streets, rather than
on the ground of municipal liability for negligence in the maintenance of parks. In
view of the numerous decisions since this case reaffirming the traditional New York
rule, it seems safe to say that this case in no way changed the law.
'
3Augustine v. Town of Brant, 249 N. Y. 198, 163 N. E. 732 (1928).
14Fritz v. City of Buffalo, 277 N. Y. 710, 14 N. E. (2d) 815 (1938); Collentine v.
City of New York, 279 N. Y. 119, 17 N. E. (2d) 792 (1938) ; Cambas v. City of
New York, 285 N. Y. 781, 35 N. E. (2d) 187 (1941).
In Minchin, v. City of Utica, 259 App. Div. 477, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 335 (4th Dep't
1940), a special rule was laid down. In that case, a bear in the zoo bit off an infant's
finger. It was held that the city was not absolutely liable because it was harboring
a wild animal, but was liable only if negligent.
15Lutzker v. Bd. of Education of City of New York, 262 App. Div. 881, 28 N. Y. S.
(2d) 496 (4th Dep't 1941), aff'd without opinion, 287 N. Y. 278, 41 N. E. (2d) 97
(1942).
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If the municipality is negligent in allowing some condition to exist within
a park which causes an injury outside the park, it is liable.'0 It is possible
that the municipality may be held to have been negligent even though the
person who actually did the act which caused the injury was not at all
negligent. In other words, the liability of the municipality and the liability
of the actor are distinct.17 If torts are committed by the agents of the
municipality, the doctrine of respondeat superior applies.' s Even though the
agent is acting outside the scope of his employment, notice and protest to
the municipality will cause it to become liable for subsequent injuries.' 9
Under the New York rule, the liability of municipalities is little different
from ordinary tort liability. This rule has, at least, the merit of simplicity
and comparative certainty. It has the approval of nearly all of the writers
on municipal tort liability. Harold J. Stiles, Jr.*
16Lamm v. City of Buffalo, 225 App. Div. 599, 233 N. Y. Supp. 516 (4th Dep't 1929);
Lane v. City of Buffalo, 232 App. Div. 334, 250 N. Y. Supp. 579 (4th Dep't 1931).
But cf. Whittaker v. Village of Franklinville, supra note 12.
'
7 Schneider v. Village of Lake George, 280 N. Y. 507, 19 N. E. (2d) 918 (1939).
'
8 Bailey et al. v. The Mayor &c. of New York, mspra note 1; Silverman v. City of
New York, 114 N. Y. Supp. 59 (App. Term 1909).
19Rafsky v. City of New York, 257 App. Div. 855, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 560 (2d Dep't
1939).
*Third-year student not a member of the QUARTERLY staff.
